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ON THE STATUS OF THE CONCEPTS OF MASCULINITY AND FEMININITY 
SARAH HOAGLAND 
Centennial College 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588 
Observer bias is considerable in studies investigating differences 
between the characters of the sexes, partly because "masculinity" 
and "femininity" are not empirical concepts. Instead, they function to 
sort out phenomena by determining a range of significance, thus 
encouraging discriminatory evaluation of human action. 
To support this I argue: 
1. Particular character traits are assessed (valued and under-
stood) differently depending on whether they apply to 
men or women. 
2. Counterexamples to the generalization, "All men are 
masculine," are not accepted as real counterexamples, 
but are rather regarded as abnormal (subnormal, not rare). 
t t t 
INTRODUCTION 
Many scientific studies address, in one way or another, 
the issue of differences between the characters of the sexes; 
and the concepts of masculinity and femininity, as the.y are 
used in scientific literature, are assumed to be based on find-
ings. As such, the issue is presupposed to be a purely factual 
one, and tests are designed to discover what the differences 
are, as well as what their source or sources are, in order to 
better understand male and female natures. Observer bias in 
these sorts of studies is considerable; women entering the 
sciences are documenting it. 
Naturally, one wonders why observer bias is prevalent. 
In fact, it arises because "masculinity" and "femininity" 
are not empirical concepts: They do not arise as a result of, 
nor are they susceptible to, empirical investigation. Instead, 
they are evaluative concepts which function to categorize 
and interpret behavioral data. 
I 
Evidence is being amassed which points to serious ob-
server bias prevalent in tests seeking a biological basis for the 
alleged phenomena of masculinity and femininity. In the 
first place, as Kaplan and Bean (1976:99ff) point out, scien-
tists exaggerate male-female differences by attempting to 
correlate traits thought to be masculine with testosterone, a 
male hormone, while failing to look for correlates of the same 
traits in female biology. Rarely are attempts made to discover 
hormonal correlates of aggression in females. Further, scien-
tists often define aggression by how it is manifested in or 
manipulated by males, seek male patterns of aggression in 
females, and conclude that females are not aggressive. Rather 
than investigate male and female patterns of aggression, which 
may differ due to situations available for expressing aggres-
sion, scientists report that aggression is a male trait-the very 
assumption on which the research was based. In the name of 
establishing fact, scientists perpetuate cultural value. 
Other aspects of observer bias are indicated when one 
compares results of similar hormonal studies conducted at 
different times by different scientists. Rosenberg (1973) 
surveyed studies of castrated male guinea pigs that had been 
injected with estrogen. As published by one group, this re-
sulted in increased mounting activity. According to another, 
it resulted in decreased mounting and increased receptive 
postures. A third group reported a decrease in any sexual 
behavior. Rosenberg (1973:114) notes: "When three differ-
ent laboratories get three different results on nearly identical 
experiments, observer bias, even in guinea pigs, is very likely." 
The history of research on sex differences indicates that ex-
perimental methods are fraught with cultural bias. 
Yet another aspect of observer bias has been brought to 
light by Homey (1974). When mapped on a bell curve, the 
results of tests designed to indicate the presence of analytic 
ability, such as Whitkin's rod and frame test, yield far greater 
statistical differences between individuals within one sex 
than between the sexes. Nevertheless, differences between the 
sexes are deemed significant, purportedly indicating a sex 
difference in analytic ability. But the results defy predictabil-
ity of individual behavior and do not justify differential treat-
ment, thus revealing that the alleged statistical significance is 
illusory. (Dr. Horney proposes looking for differences of 
character traits within situations, not within biology. In this 
way, one need not regard Golda Meir or Indira Ghandi as 
abnormal females, but rather as normal heads of state.) 
Grave consequences of observer bias become apparent 
when male scientists are asked whether political restrictions 
on women are biologically justifiable. Hall (1976 :81) notes 
that biologists are frequently called upon "to evaluate the 
extent and significance of biologically controlled differences 
between the sexes." Nineteenth-century scientists provided 
"professional" opinions with respect to women's capacity to 
reason. One outstanding example of observer bias in the late 
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nineteenth century, noted by Klein (1971 :4243), was the 
certainty of brain anatomists that the frontal lobe, which was 
then believed to be the seat of thought, was more developed 
in males than females. (And it was not until scientists no 
longer believed the frontal lobe to be the seat of thought that 
they admitted the male frontal lobe is not larger than that of 
the female.) As Whitbeck (1976) points out, the ''women-are-
undeveloped-men" view pervades scientific theory. 
Scientists "found" femininity to be incompatible with 
rationality, and this was used to justify political restrictions 
on women. As Korsemeyer (1976) explains, seventeenth-
century liberal philosophers such as Locke justified the rights 
of citizenship on the basis of man's ability to reason, an ability 
which distinguishes him from (other) animals. Naturally, if 
women were not prone to rationality, there were no grounds 
on which to bestow the rights of citizenship, i.e., to remove 
political restrictions. 
II 
Observer bias, thus, is a serious problem prevalent in 
studies investigating character differences between men and 
women. This is not simply due to failings of individual scien-
tists. A conceptual confusion is involved, for the status of 
"masculinity" and "femininity" is not empirical. The concepts 
do not arise from empirical investigation and discovery, nor 
are they really susceptible to disputation. 
In the first place, character traits paradigmatic of "mas-
culinity ," such as aggression, are assessed differently depend-
ing on whether they apply to men or women. Aggression is 
normally considered a flaw in women while regarded as an 
asset in men. On the surface, this appears to be insufficient 
indication that "masculinity" and "femininity" are not em-
pirical. By analogy, fragility is valued differently when applied 
to various forms of glass; it is considered a flaw in window-
panes and an asset in wine glasses. Nevertheless, the basis for 
the valuation is empirical. Windowpanes require sturdiness to 
be effective weathering agents, while the purposes for which 
wine glasses are designed make sturdiness a defect. 
However, the analogy does not hold. Windowpanes are 
designed and manufactured by people for a certain purpose. 
Men and women are not designed or manufactured by people 
for a certain purpose. To claim that aggression as valued in 
men but not in women is analogous to sturdiness as valued in 
windowpanes but not in wine glasses, is to commit a form of 
the naturalistic fallacy. The implication is that men and 
women, while not designed by people, are designed by nature, 
as if the fact that aggression is valued in men but not in 
women is justified by (natural) fact, by the natural purposes 
for which they were designed and used. However, since people 
did not design men and women-if, indeed, it even makes 
sense to talk of men and women being designed-any purpose 
for which they might be used is determined only from ob-
serving what they are capable of. (This is not true of window-
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panes.) And as not all things men and women are capable of 
are valued (e.g., women are capable of aggression), there is no 
basis in (natural) fact for valuing aggression in men but not 
women. So, the matter is not analogous to the valuation of 
sturdiness in windowpanes but not wine glasses. Hence, that 
traits paradigmatic of "masculinity" and "femininity" are 
valued differently, depending on whether they apply to males 
or females, suggests that such traits do not play a legitimate 
role in correlations seeking biological bases of sex differentia-
tion. It also indicates that "masculinity" and "femininity" 
are not based on empirical findings. 
In the second place, character traits paradigmatic of 
"masculinity" and "femininity" are not only assessed differ-
ently in that they are valued differently in men and women, 
they are also understood differently. (This is not true of 
fragility in glass.) An aggressive male is normally seen as confi-
dent and ambitious. AggreSSion in a woman is normally viewed 
as indicative of frustration and neurosis. As confidence is 
rarely equated with frustration, researchers are bound to 
"fmd" that male and female natures differ, which is to say 
that such fmdings are not the result of empirical discovery but 
rather of cultural biases. And this is, at least in part, because 
the concepts of masculinity and femininity encourage dis-
criminatory perception and evaluation of human action such 
as aggressive behavior. As such, the concepts themselves do 
not arise from empirical investigation, nor are they really 
susceptible to disconfirmation. 
III 
Perhaps the easiest way to detect the status of a concept 
is to form a generalization and test it by counterexample. If a 
concept is empirical in nature, that is, susceptible to research, 
the generalization will be susceptible to refutation. For exam-
ple, the generalization, "All bachelors are unmarried men," 
is unlike the generalization, "All grass is green," in that the 
latter is subject to empirical investigation, while the former 
is not. Novelist Willa Cather describes the reddish prairie grass 
of Nebraska, and one could discover upon investigation that, 
in fact, not all grass is green. In this case, a counterexample 
proves the generalization false. Further, red prairie grass is no 
more and no less a subnormal strain of grass than is green crab 
grass or Kentucky bluegrass. All are real grass, even if there are 
some differences in chemical composition. 
Alternatively, should a novelist attempt to describe 
bachelors who are married, this is not the sort of topic about 
which investigations might be conducted. The truth of "All 
bachelors are unmarried men" stems from the words them-
selves. Anyone claiming to have a counterexample has simply 
not learned what "bachelor" means. Nothing will function as 
a counterexample, which is to say that the concept is not· 
subject to scientific research. It is not empirical. It is analytic. 
Now consider the statements, "All women are feminine" . 
or "All men are masculine." When a novelist describes a man~ 
who is not masculine, the situation is not entirely analogous 
to the bachelor example; the temptation' is not actually to 
claim that this person does not understand what "men" 
means. However, it is equally true that one does not react as 
in the grass example. The result has not been a simple dis-
covery, perhaps with surprise, that not all men are masculine. 
Instead, the counterexamples are acknowledged, but are not 
accepted as "real" men. Somehow these men are abnormal, 
"effeminate." Only certain traits are applicable to "real" 
men, even though other traits are found in men. This is to say 
that the basis for selection lies in cultural value and not in 
empirical investigation and discovery. 
One might object, by analogy, that a counterexample to 
"All cats are four-legged" is also regarded as abnormal; hence, 
that counterexamples are not readily accepted does not show 
that a given claim is not empirical. Yet, the analogy does not 
hold. In the first place, the abnormality arises due to the fact 
that the cat was once four-legged and has since lost a leg due 
to an accident. Further, a cat having three legs as a result of 
an accident is not thereby less of a "real" cat. And should 
a three-legged strain of cat develop, one would come to dis-
cover that not all cats are four-legged. Three-legged cats would 
eventually be viewed as no more an abnormal, i.e., substan-
dard, strain of cat than red grass is viewed as an abnormal 
strain of grass, rare, perhaps, depending on numbers, but not 
substandard, not any less a real cat. 
Others might object that there is a significant difference 
between generalizations (All men are masculine) and generali-
ties (Most men are masculine), and while a counter example 
to the former is regarded as abnormal rather than a "real" 
counterexample, it is because in fact the generality is true. 
This, however, begs the question. 
The distinction between a generalization and a general-
ity is useful only when one is trying to prove a generality false. 
One bit of red grass proves that not all grass is green, but it 
does not disprove the generality, "Most grass is green." Yet, 
this does not salvage the generality from the issue raised here. 
When a counterexample is uncovered in science, while it can 
potentially prove a theory false, it may, in fact, be used to 
prove the theory false, or it may be discounted as an excep-
tion. But there are limits to discarding counterexamples, be-
yond which they become significant. In the case of investiga-
tions of differences between men and women relating to the 
characters of the se~es, the discarding of counterexamples, 
even in "objectively measurable" areas, is carried to extremes. 
Thus, scientists were once convinced that female frontal lobes 
were slightly smaller than male frontal lobes, discounting as 
an exception any female frontal lobe larger than a male fron-
tal lobe. This occurred not only in spite of the fact that the 
generalization is false, but also in spite of the fact that the 
generality is false. 
Further, if an appeal to generality attempts to justify 
why a counterexample is regarded as abnormal, at most it 
might explain why a counterexample is regarded as abnormal, 
i.e., rare. But in questions about traits paradigmatic of "mas-
culinity" and "femininity," counterexamples are not regarded 
as rare; they are treated as exceptions to be discounted be-
cause they are abnormal, i.e., substandard. In truly empirical 
investigations, just a few of a sort of x do not make those 
x's any the less "real" x's. Thus, an appeal to generalities to 
salvage "masculinity" and "femininity" as empirical concepts 
fails; the evaluative nature of these concepts equally affects 
the generality and the generalization. 
N 
"Masculinity" and "femininity" are limiting concepts 
unlike "greenness" and not entirely unlike "material object." 
They function to sort out phenomena by determining a range 
of significance, and, in that sense, they limit perception. They 
facilitate interpretation of human action-action that is other-
wise interpretable-by throwing a certain light on it (as is true 
of any prejudgmental concept). Thus, for example, the actions 
of a wife who puts raw eggs in her husband's lunch pail will be 
viewed as indicative of feminine dizziness (though not profes-
sorial absent-mindedness) rather than a conscious or non-
conscious aggressive act of sabotage in a situation devoid of 
real power for self-determination. The former fits the model 
of femininity. 
Until "masculinity" and "femininity" are disregarded 
and discredited and the paradigms lose their preferred status, 
there will be no objective investigation relating to the char-
acters of males and females. There is a conceptual confusion 
underlying the attempt to conduct studies to discover char-
acteristics peculiar to women, for example, in order to dis-
cover the true nature of femininity, when the perception of 
these characteristics already depends on a concept of feminin-
ity. No wonder there is observer bias. "Masculinity" and 
"femininity" do not function as empirical concepts; hence, 
studies investigating paradigmatic traits, or phenomena relating 
to paradigmatic traits, will only reinforce existing valuations 
while appearing to locate fmdings in fact. -
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